What Turns a Blessing into a Curse? The Political Economy of Natural Resource Wealth (Invited Lecture) by Syed Mansoob Murshed
©The Pakistan Development Review 
46 : 4 Part I (Winter 2007) pp. 351–377    
Invited Lecture  
What Turns a Blessing into a Curse? The Political  
Economy of Natural Resource Wealth  
SYED MANSOOB MURSHED
*  
I review the relationship between natural resource endowment type and economic growth 
in developing countries. Certain types of natural resources, such as oil and minerals, tend to 
exhibit  concentrated  production  and  revenue  patterns,  while  revenue  flows  from  other 
resources such as agriculture are more diffuse. Most developing countries that export products 
from the first group have been prone to growth failure in recent times. The most important 
channels are political economy mechanisms, where there are negative relationships between 
natural resource rents and institutional development. An explicit model of growth collapse with 
micro-foundations in rent-seeking contests that have increasing returns in rent-seeking outlays 
is presented.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The object of this paper is to critically review the resource curse thesis. The idea is 
that countries which rely heavily on natural resource based products do badly in terms of 
economic  performance.  More  generally,  reliance  on  exports  of  all  primary  (non-
manufactured agricultural, mineral, fuel and forest based) goods was criticised a long 
time ago by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950). Essentially, this was for two reasons. The 
first was to do with the fact that in the longer run demand for (unprocessed) primary 
goods is income inelastic. Primary goods are either food items or inputs for production, 
and as income rises, the propensity to spend on these (expenditure shares) decline. The 
second  criticism  of  a  development  strategy  based  on  the  export  of  natural  resource 
products is to do with the fact that their prices are notoriously volatile. Indeed, a great 
part of Hans Singer’s distinguished career was devoted to demonstrating that there was a 
secular (long-term) tendency for primary goods prices relative to manufactured goods 
prices (the terms of trade) to decline. Be that as it may, reliance on natural resource or 
primary  goods  exports  exposes  developing  economies  to  a  boom  and  bust  cycle,  as 
revenues from these exports fluctuate over time. Perhaps, the problem does not lie with  
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endowments of natural resources per se, but a heavy reliance on unprocessed exports of 
these in an undiversified economic setting, something  that has been described  as the 
‘staple  trap’  by  authors  such  as  Auty  (1997).  A  strategy  of  development  based  on 
manufactures  has  long  been  encouraged;  see  Hirschman  (1958)  for  example,  who 
advocated  the  fostering  of  manufactures  on  account  of  the  forward  and  backward 
linkages this sector exerted on the rest of the economy.  
Table 1 presents a list of 42 developing countries that are growth failures with a 
real  per-capita  income  level  in  1998  achieved  much  earlier.  Here  we  are  looking  at 
average growth rates over a long period. Catastrophic growth failure is considered to 
have occurred in economies which attained their contemporary real per capita income 
level sometime during the 1960s or before. Severe growth failure, in turn, is considered 
to  have occurred  in  those countries that have had  more than a decade of stagnation, 
achieving their current real per capita income level either during 1970s or 1980s. All but 
6 of these countries can be described as having point-sourced or mineral/fuel natural 
resource endowments, as measured by their principal exports. The diffuse economies are 
Honduras, Mali, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia and Zimbabwe. Table 1 is constructed on 
the basis of data availability on growth rates extending back to 1960 and earlier, a total of 
98 countries. If we look into the picture after 1965, we could add, at least, Angola, Iraq 
and Ethiopia to the list of growth failures, based on a negative growth.   
Table 1 
Countries with Growth Failure 
Catastrophic  Severe 
1960 or before  During 1960s  During 1970s  During 1980s 
Central African Republic   Cote D’Ivoire  Burundi  Kenya 
Chad  Mauritania  Cameroon  Republic of Congo 
Democratic Republic of Congo
3  Togo  Gabon  
Ghana   Malawi  Ecuador 
Liberia  Bolivia  Mali  Paraguay 
Madagascar  Jamaica  Zimbabwe  Trinidad and Tobago 
Niger    
Nigeria
1   El Salvador  Jordon 
Rwanda   Guatemala  
Senegal   Guyana  
Sierra Leone   Honduras  
Somalia   Peru  
Zambia      
Algeria
1  
Haiti   Iran
2  
Nicaragua   Saudi Arabia  
Venezuela      
Philippines
1  
Note: Adopted by Perälä (2000) from Human Development Report (1996) The sample includes a total of 98 
economies with available statistics.  
1Economy considered large, 1960 population clearly above 25 million.  
2Economy considered large, 1960 population clearly above 20 million.  
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More importantly, only six (or 7 if we include Oman) mineral or fuel exporting, 
point-sourced economies have real per-capita income growth rates that exceed 2.5 per 
cent per annum on an average in the 1965-99 period; see Murshed (2004) These are 
Botswana, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Egypt and Tunisia. Of these only 
two, Botswana and Indonesia have high growth rates of over 4 per cent.  We may wish to 
consider Malaysia as point-sourced as well. Therefore, in the developing world we have 
three point-sourced success stories, and we have an empirical prima facie case for a 
resource curse. 
The rest of  the paper  is organised  as follows: Section 2  describes the adverse 
economic effects of resource booms, while Section 3 focuses on the political economy of 
resource booms and a large resource endowment, and Section 4 concludes.  
2.  ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RESOURCE BOOMS  
(a)  The Dutch Disease 
The most common macroeconomic effect associated with natural resource booms 
is known in the literature as ‘Dutch Disease’,
1   see Neary and Wijnbergen (1986), and 
Murshed  (1997,  chapter  6)  for  example.  Irrespective  of  the  cause,  a  resource  boom 
crowds  out  the  other  leading  sector  of  the  economy.  So  in  countries  that  previously 
exported manufactured goods (UK after North Sea oil, for example), that sector contracts; 
in  developing  countries  it  could  be  the  agricultural  sector.  In  an  open  economy  a 
substantial  current  account  surplus  appears,  leading  to  currency  appreciation  under  a 
regime  of  flexible  exchange  rates.  This  makes  existing  (non-resource  boom)  exports 
uncompetitive  in  world  markets.  Under  fixed  exchange  rates  the  price  of  non-traded 
domestically produced goods and services increases. Either way, there is real exchange 
rate appreciation. One of the policy implications of resource booms is to avoid excessive 
and persistent real exchange rate appreciation.  
There is a shift in the composition of domestic output from tradeables towards 
non-traded goods and services. The resource boom has an expenditure effect, as incomes 
rise, and it has a resource allocation impact, as domestic production switches to non-
traded goods and services, like construction and other forms of public expenditure. In 
certain cases, severe unemployment may characterise the adjustment path to the new 
equilibrium following the resource boom because of a huge increase in the demand for 
financial assets relative to non-traded goods [see, Neary and Wijnbergen (1984)]. The 
Dutch Disease is not a disease at all if it only shifts the pattern of production towards 
non-traded goods, as with higher incomes and more foreign exchange certain goods can 
be more cheaply imported from abroad. Policies of economic diversification need to be 
pursued to counter these developments. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) find that resource 
booms do not hamper long-term growth as long as savings net of resource depletion are 
robust. But commodity prices tend to be unstable, and the resource boom peters out when 
their prices fall over the long-term business cycle, as with the case of oil, or it could be 
that the resource in question (say oil) is simply exhausted. Is the economy capable of  
1An expression coined by the Economist magazine in 1977. This is because the discovery of gas in the 
North  Sea  was  said  to  have  contributed  to  de-industrialisation  in  the  Netherlands. Alternatively,  we  could 
employ the French term, syndrome Hollandais. It is therefore not confined to developing countries. Syed Mansoob Murshed  354
returning to its pre-boom output mix? How will it cope with these medium term boom-
bust cycles? All the evidence, especially for major oil exporters in the developing world, 
suggests  that  the  adjustment  to  falling  commodity  prices  is  associated  with  negative 
growth rates, implying that the boom period is associated with some permanent form of 
loss of competitiveness; I return to this issue in sub-section B below.         
But first, historical experience, particularly with regard to the 1870–1913 period of 
globalisation, informs us that natural resource endowment and/or booms were not always 
disadvantaging. Findlay and Lundahl (1994) construct an intersectoral model with links 
between a natural resource sector and manufacturing, where a resource boom can lead to 
growth  expansion.  They  distinguish  between  tropical  subsistence  economies  (today’s 
developing world) and the regions of recent settlement
2 such as Australia, Canada and the 
USA. Both these parts of the world interacted with an industrialised region, Europe. The 
tropical  regions  have  no  manufacturing,  unlike  the  two  other  regions,  but  have  a 
subsistence agricultural sector with a fixed wage, as well the possibility of producing 
traded  primary  goods.  Manufacturing  employs  labour  and  sector  specific  capital. 
Production in the resource sector utilises labour and a sector specific land input. Land 
utilised in the natural resource based production sector is not just exogenous, but the land 
frontier (and the output of the resource sector) can be extended by the application of 
capital input. 
Globalisation in the 19th century led to a rise in the demand and prices of primary 
goods produced both in the tropics and the regions of recent settlement. This not only 
raised the rental rate on land used in primary goods production, but also extended the 
land frontier. It also increased the demand for labour in the new world and in tropical 
regions,  and  led  to  immigration  into  the  regions  of  recent  settlement  (settled  by 
Europeans), and a movement away from subsistence farming to cash crops or mining in 
tropical regions.   Manufacturing, too, expanded in Europe and in the regions of recent 
settlement. The mechanism underlying the expansion in manufacturing was a decline in 
the real rate of interest. This raised manufacturing capital intensity, as well as the real 
wage rate. In tropical areas there was also an increase in the real wage in the primary 
goods  sector,  above  subsistence  sector  levels.  This  wage  premium  was  necessary  to 
finance additional land clearance, allowing the resource sector to expand in the absence 
of foreign investment. Even with foreign investment, a wage premium may have been 
necessary, reflecting higher productivity. In plantation type economies (point-sourced), 
for example in Latin America, landlords captured the wage premium, whereas in peasant, 
owner-occupied diffuse type societies, the extra rent accrued to peasant entrepreneurs.  
What happened later? The regions of recent settlement would be on their way to a 
bliss point of high per-capita incomes that we nowadays associate them with, because of 
the  backward  and  forward  links  to  manufacturing,  competitive  industrialisation  in 
contemporary parlance. Many tropical regions did not industrialise, stagnating instead 
into a staple trap (a fixed reliance on a few commodity exports). This outcome was more 
likely in point-sourced economies. By contrast, it is the diffuse economies, such as in 
North-East  Asia,  where  prospects  of  industrialising  were  more  promising.  This  is 
because, as Baldwin (1956) points out, peasant entrepreneurs will generate demand for 
simple, labour intensive manufactures, which later become exportable. Further on, these  
2A term originally coined by the League of Nations.   Political Economy of Natural Resource Wealth     355
economies move up the manufacturing product cycle. Moreover, peasant societies are 
also more likely to support publicly financed infrastructure and human capital formation, 
compared to countries dominated by a small elite interested in siphoning off resource 
rents.  Also,  when  point-sourced  or  mineral/fuel  based  economies  experiment  with 
industrialisation, it is usually capital intensive and dependent on public subsidy. They are 
often  non-traded  as  pointed  out  in  Murshed  (2001);  for  domestic  consumption  only; 
uncompetitive and unsustainable in the long run. Clearly, the crucial link is between the 
resource sector and manufacturing. If the nascent manufacturing sector is competitive, 
resource booms can act as the spur towards future growth and sustainable development.    
(b)  Loss of Competitiveness  
Sachs and Warner (2001) present empirical evidence suggesting that countries rich 
in natural resources tend to have higher price levels, and as a result their non-natural 
resource based goods are uncompetitive and cannot be exported. They, therefore, miss 
out on the benefits of export-led growth that many other developing countries poorly 
endowed with natural resources have gained from, say in East Asia. They also argue that 
a high natural resource endowment adversely effects growth even after previous growth 
and other factors that militate against economic growth are taken into account such as a 
tropical location, distance from the sea and a high disease burden.   
Why should the loss of competitiveness in non-natural resource based exports be a 
problem  for  the  future?  Surely  competitiveness  in  exports,  say  labour-intensive 
manufactures, may be acquired at some future date when natural resource revenues dry 
out. As the model in Krugman (1987) illustrates, if there are learning by doing effects, a 
country whose manufacturing base is eroded during a resource boom can irreversibly lose 
competitiveness, even when the real exchange rate reverts to its initial level after the 
boom  has  subsided.  Thus,  temporary  resource  booms  cause  path  dependence  or 
hysteresis, a permanent loss of competitiveness. For developing countries, this means that 
their future potential for exporting manufactured goods and diversifying the production 
base is stunted. If there are positive externalities from human-capital accumulation in 
manufacturing  only,  as  in  Matsuyama  (1992),  and  resource  booms  retard  the 
development of the more dynamic manufacturing sector, the growth path of the economy 
under free trade is lower than that of more resource poor countries. The important point is 
that following a boom-bust cycle associated with natural resource revenues, a country 
might find itself devoid of these rents, yet not industrialised and unable to catch up with 
other developing countries that are already moderately industrialised. Also, their wages 
may be too high to compete with other resource poor developing nations.  
In the paper by Sachs and Warner (1999a) a role for growth enhancing human 
capital (or skills in the work force) is incorporated into a model with a non-traded sector, 
a  traded  good  and  a  purely  exportable  natural  resource  sector.  Human  capital 
accumulation,  in  the  form  of  an  externality,  takes  place  as  a  result  of 
traded/manufacturing production only. Resource booms, in the Sachs and Warner (1999a) 
model retard the growth of the economy via the crowding out of production in the traded 
(manufactured)  sector.  The  stock  of  human  capital  is  diminished  as  employment  in 
tradeables declines; this in turn hampers future production of all goods, and hence the 
growth of the economy. Another Sachs and Warner (1999b) paper on resource booms Syed Mansoob Murshed  356
permits increasing returns to scale in either of the two sectors of the economy (traded or 
non-traded), but not in both. Increasing returns characterise the production of a range of 
intermediate inputs that could be employed in final production. The model then addresses 
whether  resource  booms  can  contribute  towards  ‘big-push’  type  industrialisation.  A 
resource boom unambiguously expands the non-tradeable sector, while at the same time 
shrinking  the traded  sector.  If  it  is  the  expanding  (non-traded)  sector  that  uses  these 
intermediate inputs, it may contribute to a successful big push. If the opposite is the case, 
and it is the traded sector which uses the intermediate inputs, big-pushes are less likely. 
Also,  unless  expectations  about  the  future  are  optimistic,  even  the  most  propitious 
circumstances may not trigger accelerated industrialisation or the big-push. Implicitly, 
these expectations are related to the political system and social capital. 
Clarida and Findlay (1992) present a model where absolute and comparative advantage 
is endogenous and policy induced. The mechanism via which this occurs is a public financed 
knowledge  based  input  (non-rivalled  and  non-excludable)  that  lowers  production  costs, 
similar to the idea in Shell (1966). This input, will not be provided by the private sector, and is 
therefore  a  pure  public  good.  One  can  also  think  of  this  input  as  human  capital,  or 
infrastructural investment. There are two sectors in the economy, one of which is akin to a 
resource sector where the benefit from the public financed input in terms of lower production 
costs is relatively lower. The other sector may be likened to manufacturing, and it derives 
greater benefit from the publicly provided input. Capital is a specific factor in manufacturing, 
whereas land is specific to the resource sector. All sectors require labour input. In these 
circumstances a resource boom will induce a lower optimal supply of the publicly financed 
input,  as  the  resource  sector  obtains  a  proportionately  smaller  benefit  from  this  input. 
Consequently, over the course of time, both sectors will be less productive, akin to a loss in 
absolute advantage in international trade. The expansion of international trade will also make 
countries with greater capital endowments gain absolute advantage in all sectors, as exports of 
manufacturing increase, inducing greater provision of the cost reducing public good.  If an 
additional, non-traded and publicly supported consumption sector is introduced, similar to the 
functioning of state owned enterprises, resource booms will retard competitiveness in both the 
other sectors even further in the presence of a strong societal or ruling class preference for this 
good. The reason is that the reduction of the supply of the publicly financed productive input 
is greater after a resource boom in the presence of a strong preference for a publicly supported 
non-traded consumption good. A greater desire for this public good may characterise rentier 
societies.  
Not all, however, is doom and gloom when an economy is blessed with a boom in 
its natural resource based exports. Several countries, Norway, the Netherlands, Indonesia, 
Malaysia  and  Botswana  among  them,  have  coped  well  with  these  bounties  in  recent 
times. Resource booms should not automatically cause the traded sector to contract and 
the non-traded sector to expand, see Murshed (2001). This is partially a result of the 
existence of excess capacity in the economy, and also when the right policies are adopted 
with regard to the real exchange rate and other manufacturing subsidies.  
(c)  Resource Rents and Public Education Expenditure  
Before examining whether mineral or energy resource rich countries spend more 
on  public  education  than  other  countries  it  is  worthwhile  dwelling  on  how  resource Political Economy of Natural Resource Wealth     357
intensity is measured. This is important, as the ranking amongst nations with regard to 
resource  dependence  might change,  depending  upon  the metric  utilised.  Furthermore, 
different units of measurement may cause fluctuating statistical significance in empirical 
models analysing the effect of resource abundance on other economic phenomenon such 
as growth or education spending. One way of measuring resource dependence would be 
simply to look at the proportionate contribution of mining (or mining and agriculture) in 
national income. This is the share of national income method. But a large mining sector 
does not necessarily imply economic dependence, as the economy might still be quite 
diversified with a large manufacturing share in national income. The country may be 
exporting industrially processed natural based products, such as in Chile. This brings us 
to the second method, which could be based on the pattern of exports. We could look at 
the principal exports of the economy. Alternatively, one could use the share of primary 
(all unprocessed exports) or mineral exports in GDP as a measure. This would be an 
export intensity measure.  Also, one might want to look at the share of minerals or energy 
in  total  exports.  A  third  type  of  measurement  could  look  at  per-capita  stocks  (for 
example, of oil reserves)  and  not flows (of oil exports, say) giving  us a  measure of 
national per-capita endowment of the value of these stocks. A fourth method may look at 
ratios of total (not per-capita) stocks of different types of capital. We could look at the 
ratio of natural to physical capital stocks. But, as Stijns (2006) points out, it would be 
problematic, if not gravely erroneous, to look at natural capital stocks as a proportion of 
all types of capital stocks (the sum of human, physical and natural capital), as in Gylfason 
(2001a). So, for example a country, say Norway, which successfully invested in the past 
in education and infrastructure would be classified as resource poor simply because it has 
a  high  stock  of  total  capital  in  the  denominator  of  the  ratio!  Equally,  an  oil-rich 
underdeveloped country (because of low stocks of human and physical capital) would be 
classified as resource rich simply because of the smallness of the denominator of the ratio 
relative  to  the  numerator.  A  fifth  metric  is  associated  with  rents.  Rent  refers  to  the 
difference between prices and costs, giving us a measure of ‘excess’ profit. This in turn 
can be calculated in per-capita terms, or measured as a share of national income. Rents 
increase when there are booms in commodity prices. Finally, if we wanted to look at 
agricultural potential we could look at arable land per-capita, see Auty (1997). For most 
purposes of measuring a country’s dependence some sort of export based measure is most 
appropriate, as it conveys information about what a country is good at and its place in the 
world economy (comparative or competitive advantage). Alternatively as a measure of 
intensity, perhaps the ratio of natural capital to physical or human capital stocks (but not 
both) could be used, as it gives us an idea of how resource rents have been used to 
accumulate other types of capital; a low ratio indicating earlier investment in other forms 
of capital.   
The  importance  of  human  capital  in  fostering  economic  growth  and  human 
development cannot be overemphasised. All of this is related to educational spending, 
mainly  public  expenditure  on  education.  Resource  rents  and  oil  windfalls  should,  in 
principle, provide governments of developing countries with extra resources to invest in 
education.  In  contrast,  is  the  idea  that  in  foreign  exchange  abundant  resource  rich 
countries there is little incentive to invest in basic skills, as there is little need to have a 
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expenditure will therefore be devoted to elite tertiary education. Again, there are many 
ways of measuring educational variables [Stijns (2006)] such as the average years of 
schooling,  the  net  secondary  enrolment  rate  and  public  spending  as  a  proportion  of 
aggregate  spending,  or  government  spending  on  education  as  a  proportion  of  total 
government expenditure.  
Birdsall,  Pinckney,  and  Sabot (2001)  show  that resource  abundance  measured  by 
cropland per-capita systematically lowers public investment in education. Similarly, Gylfason 
(2001a)  shows  that  natural  resource  rich  countries  spend  less  on  education  in  terms  of 
expected years of schooling for girls, gross secondary enrolment rates and public expenditure 
on education as a proportion of national income. But his results are flawed because his 
measure of natural resource abundance is the share of natural capital as a proportion of all 
types of capital; as indicated above this biases downwards the resource abundance of high 
income and successful countries in this category simply because they have high stocks of all 
types of capital relative to natural capital. In contrast to Birdsall, Pinckney, and Sabot (2001) 
and Gylfason (2001a), Stijns (2006) finds that for developing countries many of the measures 
of natural resource abundance can cause greater educational attainment and spending, as well 
as a higher life expectancy at birth. So, natural resource endowments may not be so bad for 
human development. There are, however, several exceptions, depending on how we measure 
natural resource dependence or intensity. Countries with a high share of mineral exports in 
total exports fare badly, as do countries with a high ratio of natural to physical capital. 
Similarly, nations with a high ratio of green capital (non-arable forests, pasturelands etc.) to 
physical capital, high agricultural export intensity and arable land per-capita are also poor 
performers in this regard. These nations may be described as unsuccessful resource abundant 
developing countries, and they include some agricultural exporters, as well as pastoralist 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. A high primary or mineral export dependence means a 
country has not diversified or industrialised, otherwise it would have been exporting more 
processed manufactures as is the case with resource rich Malaysia. Also, having a high natural 
or  green  capital  endowment  relative  to  produced  capital  is  another  sign  of  economic 
stagnation and the failure to develop, as development leads to a higher stock of physical 
capital via investment. Also, it appears that high proportions of cropland and timber wealth 
relative to physical capital stocks are worse for education and health indicators than high 
ratios of oil wealth to physical capital stocks. Furthermore, there are also no signs of countries 
systematically favouring tertiary over secondary education.             
In summary, evidence for the purely economically based resource curse is mixed. 
It may depend upon the time period analysed, as it is a recent phenomenon. Also, it is not 
a  universal  malaise;  the  right  policies  in  a  good  institutional  setting  will  lead  to  the 
avoidance of the curse. We now turn to the political economy of resource rents.   
3.  POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESOURCE RENTS 
Good quality institutions are crucial to fostering growth in the long-term. They 
may be even more important than policies, whose effect is more short-term; in any case 
good or the right policies will be largely ineffective in a poor institutional environment. It 
has also been suggested that a nation’s endowments may have something to do with the 
determination  of  its  institutions.  In  this  sub-section  I  examine  political  economy 
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(a)  Theory 
In  a  nutshell  the  negative  effects  of  resource  rents  from  a  political  economy 
perspective arise when it leads to rent-seeking and corruption which has a destructive 
effect on normal productive investment and hence growth. All of this depends upon the 
incentives that are presented to political leaders, because in certain circumstances they 
may  choose  unenlightened  rent  seeking  policies  that  suit  them and  a  narrow  interest 
group, and in a different environment they will decide not to and be more benevolent; see 
Auty and Gelb (2001). In both instances their behaviour is perfectly rational, except that 
in the former case it is in conflict with long-term national development. There is also the 
further possibility that they may deliberately undermine institutions and/or institutional 
development, so as to further their own ends. We may organise our theoretical discussion 
along the lines of rent seeking induced by bad institutions, and the impact of resource 
rents  on  future  institutional  development.  The  former  refers  to  rent  seeking  in  an 
institutional environment that encourages it and is already quite corrupt; the latter refers 
to either a deliberate attempt to subvert institutional restraints such that kleptocracy can 
flourish, or creating a set of incentives that prevent the development of good institutions. 
When  we  come  to  the  empirical  examination  of  these  phenomenon,  the  theoretical 
distinction between the harm caused by malfunctioning institutions already present, and 
bad  institutions  created  as  a  result  of  resource  rents  almost  become  observationally 
equivalent.    
With regard to the first type of channel described above, that of rent seeking in an 
enabling environment for these activities, mention can be made of a theory of the optimal 
allocation of talent, as analysed in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991). The idea being 
that talent can focus either on production or predation and corruption. This decision is a 
function of the relative returns to these two activities; predation may be more attractive 
when there is a wealth of natural resource rents.   Capturable resource rents can lead to 
rent-seeking behaviour; revenues and royalties from oil or mineral resources are much 
more  readily  appropriable  when  compared  to  the  income  flows  from  agricultural 
commodities. Increases in the availability of resource rents following a boom in their 
world prices can increase the appetite for resource rents amongst certain individuals or 
groups  within  society.  Lane  and  Tornell  (1996)  postulate  that  many  societies  have 
powerful interest groups that are coalitions formed in order to extract rents or a tribute 
from the rest of society. They could exist for historical reasons. Transfers to these groups 
are effected at the expense of others, and sometimes even the general productivity of the 
economy. Resource booms and windfalls increase the appetite for transfers within these 
powerful coalitions by a factor that is more than proportionate to the size of the boom. 
These groups become greedier, and demand an even larger share of national income. This 
is known as a voracity effect [Lane and Tornell (1996)]; a similar mechanism is described 
as the rentier effect by Ross (2001). Furthermore, entrepreneurs may choose to become 
corrupt rent-seekers rather than engage in the ordinary business of production, and this 
constitutes a major diversion of talent away from production, see also Torvik (2002). 
Moreover, in some societies rent-seeking is more widespread than others, depending on 
the  institutional  environment,  referred  to  as  grabber  friendly  institutions  by  Mehlum, 
Moene and Torvik (2006), as opposed to producer friendly institutions. In Murshed’s 
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production, but can even diminish the availability of productive capital over time, and a 
lower capital stock is what causes the eventual decline in growth. Unlike recent papers in 
this  genre,  it  has  explicit  micro-macro  theoretical  properties,  with  an  explicit 
macroeconomic  model  of  growth  collapse.  He  models  an  explicit  rent  seeking  game 
where  they  can  be  increasing  returns  to  scale  in  rent  seeking,  related  to  institutional 
quality. The worse the quality of institutions and the poorer the governance the more 
profitable it is to engage in rent seeking. Thus, not only is rent seeking made explicitly 
endogenous to institutional quality, but innovatively there can be increasing returns to 
scale in this activity. The extent of the rent seeking also depends on the available quantity 
of capturable resource rents, as in Torvik (2002). This encourages more players to enter 
this  game  and  more  wasteful  consequences  for  the  economy,  including  the 
macroeconomic growth collapse (details are given in the Appendix).   
Anderson and Askalen (2007) find that there is no resource curse for parliamentary 
democracies  in  contrast  to  presidential  systems.  Although  the  result  is  an  empirical 
finding,  it  also  has  theoretical  overtones.  Essentially,  it  is  related  to  the  fact  that 
Presidential  systems  concentrate  more  power  in  one  person,  and  are  therefore  more 
factional  and  rent-seeking.  The  Presidential  system  implies  more  rent  extraction  by 
politicians,  a  larger  public  sector,  and  public  spending  targeted  towards  powerful 
minorities rather than broad-based spending programmes. The problem with this work is 
that many so-called Westminster style Prime Ministerial systems in the developing world 
are  actually  quite  Presidential  in  practice,  as  there  is  a  weak  separation  of  powers, 
combined with clientelism and factionalism. Robinson and Torvik (2005) also argue that 
increased resource rents encourage politicians in factional (such as those driven by tribal 
allegiances)  or  clientelist  (patronage  politics)  societies  to  invest  in  ‘White  Elephant’ 
projects. These are projects that are inherently loss making, but once the sunk cost is 
incurred,  the  project  is  implemented.  Despite  the  fact  that  they  are  loss  making  and 
actually may be growth retarding long-term, they are nevertheless adopted because they 
act as a commitment device with the faction or support group essential to the politician’s 
political survival. Obviously, it is this client group who benefit from the White Elephants, 
so costly to the national exchequer. 
Caselli  and  Cunningham (2007)  outline  a taxonomy  of  possible  situations  that 
shape  rulers  incentives.  It  is  based  on  (a)  countries  or  institutional  settings  that  are 
relatively more centralised (ruled by a dictator or small elite) compared to decentralised 
cases (with wider political participation; (b) where there is a budget constraint, in contrast 
to situations there are no limits to resources to be spent; they also characterise situations 
where  a  public  good  needs  to  be  provided  [akin  to  Findlay  and  Clarida  (1994)]  to 
increase the productivity of the non-resource productive sector; situations where there is 
an effort (creating moral hazard problems) that needs to be exercised by leaders; and, also 
leaders who want to maximise revenue accruing to themselves and not national welfare, 
whose probability of staying in power is limited. A sudden natural resource windfall 
increases the value of staying in power indefinitely as there is more to loot at present and 
in  the  future.  What  happens  then  depends  upon  the  leaders  incentives;  consider  for 
example: 
The Busy Leader: this is a constrained leader in a centralised system, who has to 
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development and efforts to stay in power, which could include spending resources on 
political  repression.  An  increase  in  natural  resource  revenues  will  detract  from 
development  effort,  and  cause  a  decline  in  per-capita  income.  If  the  leader  is 
unconstrained it raises the value of staying in power, and a resource boom will cause him 
to engage in more repression, although spending resources and effort on development 
also  has  a  chance  of  increasing  if  both  activities  (repression  and  development)  are 
complements. Similarly, political support and aid from the West during the cold war and 
the present-day war on terror could tip the balance in favour of more repression relative 
to  development  effort.  Note,  that  political  patronage  in  relatively  decentralised  and 
partially  democratic  systems  can  be  a  substitute  both  for  repression  and  broad-based 
economic development. The question is what cements relationships between the patron 
and client—a common ethnicity based on religion, language or tribal affinity, or other 
forms of commitment devices such as inefficient projects, as in Robinson and Torvik 
(2005). 
The Visionary Leader: this person may spend more resources on development if it 
increases his chances of survival, as in the case of Suharto in Indonesia, but may do the 
opposite if it lowers the perceived probability of his survival, as in the case of Zaire’s 
Mobutu.  
A  Resigned  Leader:  this  leader  may  see  that  following  a  resource  boom  his 
chances of future survival are low because others will try to overthrow him, so that he 
becomes resigned. In effect it has raised his discount rate for the future, and he will do 
less productive investment in development in order to survive.  
The  Lazy  Leader:  Large  windfalls,  as  in  the  Gulf,  can  give  leaders  enough 
resources to do everything. They may spend less time governing and more on leisure. 
Alternatively,  in  poorer  countries  they  could  let  the  rest  of  the  country  languish  in 
poverty as long as they enjoy a lavish lifestyle.  
In  connection  with  the  second  theoretical  mechanism,  where  resource  rents 
explicitly hamper institutional development, authors such as Karl (1999) have described 
the spending behaviour of oil rich economies as ‘petromania’, referring to irresponsible 
consumption following oil booms. For example, it has been suggested that in Angola 
more than US$ 1 billion of oil revenues vanished per year through corruption in the 1996 
to  2001  period.  More  generally,  a  wealth  of  mineral  resources  or  plantation-based 
production  can  spawn  extractive  and  non-developmental  institutions  that  eventually 
become entrenched [Sokoloff and Engerman (2000)]. Ross (2001) argues that resource 
rents, particularly oil revenues, could retard democratic development. A recent empirical 
study by the IMF (2005) also suggests that institutional quality could be damaged by the 
presence of fuel exports.  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model underdevelopment as the result of political 
elites blocking technological and institutional development because such developments 
may  erode  the  elites’  incumbency  advantage.  This  is  more  likely  when  rents  from 
maintaining  power  are  high,  such  as  where  public  income  is  derived  from  natural 
resources.  Robinson,  et  al.  (2006)  show  how  politicians  have  a  short  time  horizon 
because they discount the future by the probability that they remain in power, which is 
damaging from a social perspective. With more resources, the future utility of having 
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probability they remain in power increases. To do so they invest in a bloated public 
sector, rather like the White Elephants in Robinson and Torvik (2005).  
(b)  Cross-sectional Evidence 
Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) find that when they interact natural resource 
abundance with the quality of institutions in a growth regression, the resultant coefficient 
is significant. This means that natural resource abundance has adverse effects only in the 
presence of poor institutions. Their analysis, however, is purely cross-sectional, and they 
do not take into account the potential reverse causality between institutional quality and 
growth (both of which have a causal effect on the other). Collier and Goderis (2007) use 
an error correction panel data regression model, which is both dynamic and addresses 
reverse  causality,  to  differentiate  long-run  and  short-run  effects  of  commodity  price 
booms on economic growth. They find that commodity booms have a positive short-term 
effect on output, but adverse long-term effects. The long-term effects are confined to 
“high-rent”, non-agricultural commodities, by differentiating commodity prices between 
agricultural (diffuse) and non-agricultural (point) goods. Within the latter group, they 
also  find  that  the  resource  curse  is  avoided  by  countries  with  sufficiently  good 
institutions, by (a) including an interaction term between the commodity price index and 
a dummy for good institutions (with Portugal as the benchmark), and (b) separating the 
regressions into two groups that differentiate countries with bad and good governance.  
Collier and Hoeffler (2007) unpack democracy into (i) electoral competition and 
(ii) checks and balances, and examine their interaction with natural resource rents (as a 
share of GDP) in determining GDP growth. The blend between resource rents and strong 
electoral competition  is growth reducing; while the mix  of resource rents and strong 
checks  and  balances  yield  growth  enhancing  outcomes.  They  argue  that  while  the 
‘Neocon’ agenda is to promote democracy through electoral competition, in fact what is 
needed are checks and balances on the executive. Democracy without constraints on the 
executive could be harmful. 
Aoun  (2006)  studies  growth  between  1980  and  2000  in  a  cross-section  of 
countries, including developed and developing countries. A number of oil rich countries 
are included in her analysis, but crucially the only oil rich Middle Eastern country present 
in the study is Kuwait. She enters the ratio of oil rent (the difference between the price 
obtained for oil and the cost of extraction times output) over national income, as an 
explanatory  variable  for  growth.  In  simple  regressions,  she  finds  a  negative  and 
statistically significant effect for oil rents, but this significance vanishes when data on 
institutional  quality  (corruption,  bureaucratic  quality,  democracy)  is  introduced.  This 
means that oil rents exert a negative influence only where institutional quality is poor. 
This is an interesting finding despite the fact that her econometric analysis is seriously 
flawed: she does not control for the endogeneity (or reverse causality) between growth 
and institutions, as growth impacts on the quality of institutions as well as the other way 
around; she utilises only a simple cross-sectional technique and not panel data methods 
which  take  the  time  dimension  into  account;  she  does  not  control  for  the  effects  of 
extreme cases or outliers on the sample.     
Ross (2001) finds that countries rich in mineral resources, particularly oil, do not 
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tends  to  be  low.  The  reasons  he  identifies  are  the  following.  There  is  a  lack  of 
“modernisation” as economic wealth does not translate into social and cultural change. 
Secondly, there is a repression effect, mineral and oil rich states can engage in higher 
levels of military and internal security expenditure to suppress dissent. Thirdly, public 
goods may be provided along side low taxes because resource rents are the main source 
of revenue for the state. Taxation normally results in eventual pressures from the taxed 
public to introduce democracy. Finally, and most importantly there is a rentier effect. 
Revenues from oil and mineral resources create rents that can be utilised to bribe the 
population into acquiescing to authoritarianism. By contrast, Smith (2004) finds that oil 
rich economies exhibit a great deal of political regime durability, arguing that the stability 
of the political system cannot be accounted for by repression, but that oil economies form 
stable domestic coalitions implying the absence of strongly negative rentier-type effects.  
In  their  cross-sectional  econometric  analysis,  Isham,  Woolcock,  Pritchett  and 
Busby (2005) find that point-sourced economies identified as exporters of oil, mineral 
and plantation based crops have lower growth rates compared to diffuse (agricultural) and 
manufactured exporters in the 1975-97 period because of the poorer governance (based 
on  the  Kaufmann  indicators  mentioned  above)  engendered  by  a  fuel,  mineral  or 
plantation  dependent  economy.  The  challenge  is  to  extend  the  pure  cross-sectional 
econometric analysis so that it has a time dimension, and delve deeper into the role of 
different  types  of  resource  endowment  on  institutional  formation.  The  Mavrotas, 
Murshed and Torres (2007) estimation is, however, one of the few panel data analyses in 
this connection. As with Isham, et al. (2005) they instrument for endogeneity problems. 
Their results suggest that both point-source and diffuse type natural resource endowments 
retard the development of democracy (measured by Polity) and good governance (Fraser 
Institute data), which in turn hampers economic growth. So there is a more widespread 
resource curse, valid for both endowment types. Point sourced economies have a worse 
impact  on  governance,  and  governance  is  more  important  for  growth  compared  to 
democracy. Diffuse economies appear to slow down democratic development fractionally 
more than point sourced economies; we should not be tempted into concluding that point 
sourced endowments are better for democratic development, because that is patently not 
the case. The resource curse of point-sourced endowments definitely looms large, as it is 
more  growth  retarding  via  even  poorer  governance  than  diffuse  natural  resources. 
Manufacturing,  and  manufactured  goods  exports,  do  promote  better  governance  and 
democracy.  This  in  turn  helps  to  explain  the  superior  growth  performance  of 
manufactured goods exporting nations. Not only is the presence of manufactured exports 
an indication of a more diversified and growing economy, but this may be so because 
these countries have better institutions of governance and higher levels of democracy.  
Brunnschweiler  and  Bulte  (2008)  challenge  the  notion  of  resource  curse  that 
relates natural resource endowment with bad economic outcomes in their cross-sectional 
analysis. Compared with previous empirical studies on resource curse, the paper makes a 
significant innovation by differentiating between resource dependence (RD) and resource 
abundance (RA), definitions that were used interchangeably in many previous studies. 
Their measure of resource dependence is resource exports to GDP and mineral exports to 
GDP; the per capita value of natural resource assets and sub-soil assets is their resource 
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institutions,  using  the  following  instruments:  the  constitution  (presidential  versus 
parliamentarian) and trade openness for resource dependence, and absolute latitude for 
institutions. They find that resource dependence (RD) has no significant effect on growth 
(although  the  sign  is  still  negative),  contrary  to  many  earlier  findings  regarding  the 
resource curse. By contrast, they find that resource abundance has significantly positive 
effects on growth either directly in a growth regression or indirectly through institutional 
improvements  (measured  by  the  rule  of  law  and  government  effectiveness  from  the 
Kaufmann  data  set).  In  short,  greater  resource  abundance  leads  to  better  quality 
institutions and more rapid growth, a counter-intuitive finding that is echoed by Smith 
(2004) in his findings about oil wealth and its negative relation to repression and positive 
relation to regime survival. In many ways the Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) results 
are  understandable  when  one  makes  a  distinction  between  resource  abundance  and 
dependence. As already indicated, a resource abundant nation may not be very resource 
dependent,  if  it  has  wisely  chosen  to,  and  has  had  time  to  diversify  its  production 
structure  through  economic  growth,  which  also  raises  the  living  standards  of  the 
citizenry. Indeed, resource dependence may be a reflection of the failure to grow and 
develop  good  economic  and  political  institutions,  along  with  the  associated  poverty, 
inequality and poor human development.   
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
What  makes  a  resource-rich  country’s  economy  prosper  or  falter  over  the 
inevitable boom and bust cycle that resource rents imply? The literature reviewed above 
suggests that the political economy of resource rents, and the (short to medium-term) 
economic policies adopted, make up the two main factors underlying success or failure.  
With regard to the political economy of development strategies, Dunning (2005) 
analyses choices by rulers regarding the future growth path of the economy in the context 
of natural resource abundance. He compares Mobutu’s Zaire (1965-1997) to Suharto’s 
Indonesia (1965-98) and Botswana during the same period. In Botswana, revenues from 
Kimberlite  (deep  mine  shaft)  diamonds  were  very  stable,  due  to  Botswana’s  unique 
relationship  with  the  South  African  diamond  company  De  Beers  and  its  important 
position as a major supplier. It did not need to diversify it economy.  But it chose a 
developmental path because of the mature nature of political elites there. In Indonesia and 
Zaire  resource  flows  were  volatile.  In  one  case  the  dictator  (Suharto)  chose 
diversification and growth enhancing strategies, as well as policies aimed at equalisation 
and poverty reduction to contain political opposition. In the other case, Mobutu did not, 
because he felt that diversification and investment in infrastructure would loosen his grip 
on power and strengthen political opposition to him based on ethnicity. Both Mobutu and 
Suharto, in particular, owed their existence, at least initially, to the patronage of the USA 
and western powers. Perhaps,  in  East Asia greater fears of  communism strengthened 
benevolence in dictators (South Korea, Taiwan Singapore and Indonesia), whereas in 
Africa a certain type of factionalism dominated policies and politics, retarding growth 
enhancing economic diversification and infrastructural development. The resource curse 
is not just confined to natural resources; a sudden increase in aid can have similar effects. 
In Pakistan, increased bilateral aid from the USA (late 1950s, early 1960s, 1980s and 
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When  we  come  to  the  political  economy  of  resource  rents  itself,  Snyder  and 
Bhavnani (2005) argue that the causal mechanism between rent seeking behaviour and 
resource rents may lie in a government revenue effect. Even if a lootable sector exists it 
may not be as crucial to the state’s coffers if other revenue sources exist side-by-side. 
Finally, and most importantly, how governments spend their revenue matters: if the state 
spends its revenues on social welfare and growth enhancing investment, conflict is less 
likely than if it appropriates revenues for factional and kleptocratic purposes.  
It should be noted that rent-seeking, bribery and corruption are not just about the 
quality of domestic institutions in resource rich nations. There are always two sides to the 
corruption coin, the demand side and the supply side; this principle applies also in the 
case  of  resource  rents.  Large  bribes  to  governing  elites,  as  well  as  the  violent 
manipulation of governments in the global South by companies and states in the global 
North in order to gain commercial advantage by their extractive multi-nationals was very 
common during the cold war, and have not quite withered away in our uni-polar world.
3 
Super-power politics during the cold war, and interference by the world’s only remaining 
superpower (the USA) has an important part to play in determining the historical path of 
institutional  development,  whose  legacy  can  be  more  negative  in  some  cases  (Zaire 
above), and less negative in others (Indonesia).  
This leaves us with policies towards long-term growth, which have a shorter or 
more medium-term impact. Many of these choices are not as deliberate as we might 
presume; they are often accidentally adopted or are the outcome of mixed motivations on 
the part of those deciding on policy. Success may be more related to serendipity rather 
than design. It is, nevertheless, instructive to contrast cases of success such as Botswana 
and Malaysia after the 1970s on the one hand, against failures such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Zaire), on the other hand. In the Malaysian case [Mahani (2001)], the 
government: (a)  ended up redistributing  income,  via government expenditure policies 
targeting ethnic Malays, who were the poorer community, thus avoiding ethnic conflict at 
least after 1969; (b) invested in infrastructure and human capital; and (c) pursued policies 
of competitive industrialisation, based initially on foreign direct investment. Botswana 
avoided  factionalism  through  political  consensus.  Botswana’s  economy  is,  however, 
considerably less diversified compared to Malaysia, providing us with one instance of a 
high growth, conflict free undiversified economy relying on a capital-intensive natural 
resource (Kimberlite diamonds). Thus, the most important policy goal involves moving 
away from the nation’s dependence on unprocessed natural resource exports, as in the 
case of Malaysia and Thailand. These include investment in skills (starting with primary 
education and universal literacy) which take a longer time to mature, policies to acquire 
foreign  direct  investment  leading  to  technology  transfer,  and  above  all  fostering 
industrialisation that is internationally competitive.  
Finland  and  Norway  are  two  examples  of  successful  European  resource  rich 
countries; the first in its timber resources, and the latter in oil. Finland’s current economic 
success  is  not  built  on  forestry,  but  rather  revolves  around  high  technology  mobile 
telephony associated with Nokia. By contrast, in Norway oil continues to be the major  
3Historically,  multinational  firms  such  as  the  British  and  Dutch  East  India  companies  literally 
established empires to further their commercial interests and profitability, even running formidable military 
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export, and it does not have high technology manufactured goods sectors comparable to 
Sweden and Finland. Consequently, a few signs of Dutch Disease are discernable. The 
overall size of the public sector, however, is not significantly different in Norway than in 
neighbouring  Sweden.  However,  all  Nordic  countries,  which  had  resource  dependent 
economies at some point, passed through transitions to fully fledged democracies and 
capitalist  industrialisation  prior  to  any  resource  booms.  They,  therefore,  avoided  rent 
seeking surges by special interest groups, which tend to occur in institutionally flawed 
situations, as pointed out by Torvik (2007).  Gylfason (2001b) points out that in Norway 
the state has not only title to the country’s oil wealth, but has had command over 80 
percent  of  the  resource  rent  since  1980.  The  revenue  is  invested  in  the  Norwegian 
Petroleum Fund, akin to a trust fund for the benefit of current and future generations, but 
its  full  use  is  still  impending.  Such  a  policy  yields  a  double  dividend;  it  minimises 
macroeconomic problems associated with boom and bust cycles and allows consumption 
smoothing into the future when resource revenues dry out. A call for setting up similar 
trust funds is standard policy advice at present.  
Thus,  the  jury  is  out  on  the  issue  of  the  negative  effects  of  rich  mineral/fuel 
endowments  on  institutional  determination.  After  balancing  the  negative  and  positive 
effects,  not  all  societies  necessarily  experience  the  disadvantaging  political  economy 
effects of resource rents. This will crucially depend upon the past history of institutions, 
its colonial heritage, and the type of incentives (benevolent or malevolent from a national 
perspective) faced by its leadership, including the influence of cold war and war on terror 
geo-politics. Resource rents may have an important part to play in determining political 
and  economic  institutions  that  are  important  in  determining  long-term  growth  and 
development prospects, although the causal links are far from clear cut. The consensus is 
that their role has been negative for most developing countries in recent times, and the 
resource curse was certainly absent when one looks at the economic history of countries 
such as the USA, Canada and Australia, perhaps because they had better institutions to 
begin  with  that  helped  them  transform  resource  abundance  to  lower  (unprocessed) 
resource  dependence,  along  with  a  rising  standard  of  living.  It  is  also  worthwhile 
reminding  ourselves  that  most  indicators  of  human  development  and  well  being  are 
highly correlated with per-capita income, which means that for poor countries growth 
leading  to  increased  per-capita  income  may  provide  the  necessary  conditions  for 
improved human development on all counts.  
APPENDIX  
GROWTH COLLAPSE WITH RENT-SEEKING 
The  innovative  feature  of  the  model  that  follows  is  that  the  macroeconomic 
collapse that comes from a reduction of the capital stock has micro-foundations in rent 
seeking  contests.  We begin  with  a  competitive  game  of  rent  seeking  in  the  spirit  of 
Tullock (1967), although our primary motivation arises from the natural resource revenue 
induced rentier effect described by Ross (2001). In the Tullock framework, several agents 
compete for rents in every period that resource revenues exist. The competition to capture 
this entails a cost, be that bribery, lobbying expenditure and so on. Let P represent the 
prize that each rent-seeking agent is attempting to seize. This prize corresponds to the Political Economy of Natural Resource Wealth     367
contestable or appropriable revenue from resource rents, and Tullock type rent-seeking 
contests  assume  a  winner  take  all  situation.  This  does  not  preclude  collusive  group 
behaviour,  as  long  as  groups  compete  with  each  other.  Each  agent’s  probability  of 
success will depend on their own rent seeking expenditure relative to all others. The 
expected utility (E) of an agent (i) in a symmetrical setting can take the form: 
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In this example above there are only 2 agents, i = 1, 2. The crucial parameter s 
represents the “efficiency or productivity” of lobbying expenditure or bribery, if s > 1, 
there  is  increasing  returns  to  scale  in  such  expenditure.  If  that  is  so,  under  weak 
institutions of governance, and where the law is honoured more in the breach than in the 
keeping,  lobbying  expenditure  is  even  more  productive  as  far  as  rent-seekers  are 
concerned.  In  many  ways,  s  can  be  characterised  to  be  negatively  related  to  good 
governance and institutional quality, with s > 1 being a sign of very poor institutional 
environment. I incorporate increasing returns to scale to that activity, and the possibility 
of an attrition game. Other theoretical papers in the natural resource induced rent-seeking 
genre do not model the possibility of a variable institutional environment, which may 
encourage further  rent  seeking.  Thus,  it  is  not  only  the  total  available  prize  (P)  that 
determines rent seeking, but also that the institutional environment may promote further 
knavery. This is parameterised by s in my model.    
Substituting (2) into (1) and maximising with respect to ci we find: 
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Equation (3) gives us the Cournot-Nash equilibrium level of lobbying spending by 
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The above expression becomes negative if s > 2. If this is so, it will lead to an even 
more socially wasteful war of attrition game, where the object is to make one’s opponents 
exit  the  rent-seeking  contest  because  an  opponent’s  very  presence  yields  negative 
expected utility.  
Lobbying or rent seeking expenditure is wasteful and detracts from the capital 
stock. Total lobbying expenditures may cause a decline in the capital stock, as investment 
in capital declines. At this juncture we introduce two definitions which we intend to 
utilise in the macro-model of growth collapse: 
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We  now  turn  to  the  macro-model,  details  of  which  can  be  found  in  Murshed 
(2004). Output subject to constant returns, Y is a function of k, the capital-labour ratio: 
    f(k(t))  =  Y(t)  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  (6) 
In order to subject the system to the effects of a resource boom we incorporate an 
additive and multiplicative effect to the production function in (6): 
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Here z0 represents the diversion of a part of the capital stock from ordinary production to 
rent seeking activities, and z1 is the revenue component. They are described by Equation 
(5). The revenue component can be either positive or negative. If, as in the case of some 
countries, resource revenues are mainly transferred abroad via corruption and other forms 
of leakage, then z1 is negative in its effect on the macroeconomy. If it generates income in 
the domestic economy it is positive. The additive component, z1 has no effect on the 
marginal product of capital, and therefore no effect on investment and the capital stock. 
When positive, it immediately raises consumption, but not savings, by a proportionate 
amount.  Conversely,  consumption  declines  if  revenues  are  negative.  Adjustment  in 
income is immediate and dramatic. In an open economy, however, the country might be 
able  to  borrow  from  abroad  to  smooth  consumption  with  implications  for  future 
indebtedness and debt servicing. Note that the resource rents (z1) are exogenous in the 
sense that they are like a pure transfer or manna from heaven. The costs to the economy 
(the  multiplicative  term  z0)  are,  however,  an  endogenous  outcome  of  rent-seeking 
activities described above in Equations (1) to (4).    
I now turn to the effects of extracted resource rents on productivity, investment 
and  the  capital  stock,  again  see  Murshed  (2004)  for  details.  In  Figure  1  the  k =  0 
schedule is a horizontal line.   This tells us that the optimal capital stock is related to 
marginal productivity and not pk. The  k p = 0 line is negatively sloped as a rise in pk 
increases the rate of investment, which in turn raises the capital stock (k). However, with 
a fixed interest rate and marginal productivity of capital, the capital stock is given at its 
optimal level, k
*, such that pk = 1 in the steady state; hence k will decline. When there is a 
negative effect on the capital stock, the economy jumps from the initial equilibrium at E1 
to the new saddle-path (SS2) at point F. The  k p = 0 schedule will then shift to the left, and 
the final equilibrium is at E2. There is an initial, but not steady state, fall in the shadow 
price of capital. This makes the rate of investment negative between F and E2.which, in 
turn, causes the capital stock to decline, prompting negative growth. The economy comes 
to a rest with a lower steady state capital stock and growth rate at E2. The growth collapse 
occurs  between  F  and  E2.   Net  output  declines  in  the  new  steady  state  due  to  the 
combined effect of the diversion of output to rent seeking and a lower capital stock. 
There is also a decline in consumption associated with lower net output. Rent seeking 
expenditure per se is greater the higher the prize, P in (1) to (4) or z1 in (7). This implies a 
large amount of resource rents. But, more importantly, total rent seeking expenditure for 
any level of natural resource rents will be greater when the polity is more predatory, 
oligarchic and poor institutions abound. This means that z0 is large in (7) and   s > 1. In 
other situations, where natural resource revenues are more diffuse, the prize (P) could be Political Economy of Natural Resource Wealth     369
considerably smaller (say P/n, the population being given by n). Also, in societies where 
many agents enter the rent-seeking contest, the benefit to each of lobbying expenditure is 
smaller.   In either case, z0  will be smaller, as s < 1, and the resultant negative growth 
effect is also diminished. A developmental state working with superior institutions that is 
democratic  or  benevolent  would  reduce  lobbying  and  rent  seeking  expenditure.  Rent 
seeking contests would not yield much to corrupt agents, who would be better off in 
productive entrepreneurial activities. In that case, natural resource revenues would not 
retard growth (z0  = 0). It would also mean P or z1 (the resource rents) in (7) would 
become a part of the regular production process in (6).  
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Comments   
The thesis put forward by the author is in the traditional manner. There is every reason 
to accept thought put forward in the papers but that is the reality of what has been stated. 
I am not going to list the basis or the issues as they have been propounded but deal 
with it as: 
• The performances of the countries relying heavily on natural resources based do 
badly in terms of economic performance.  
There can be little argument on the evaluation for the evidence heavily is on the 
side of the author. Developing countries have not done well and in fact the economic 
malaise that they are in is a direct outcome and is evidence to that affect is available in 
the paper. 
• The demand for unprocessed primary products is income inelastic. 
Given the current level of knowledge this is so. The current hiccup in the world 
market for cereals is not going to last but is a short-term phenomenon.  
• The  natural  resource  products  are  notoriously  volatile.  The  terms  of  trade 
militate against those relying on primary goods or natural resources.  
There is, given the current knowledge, an assessment of subject matter that holds 
in the economic situation as it is.  
• The  result  of  this  is  that  the  developing  countries  are  asked  to  rely  on 
manufactured  products,  as  there  are  backward  and  forward  linkages  that  are 
exerted on the economy.   
Evidence to support the views is taken from secondary data over a considerable 
period of time. This is the classic way of analyses of a countries data by economists and 
therefore meets the current culture of aggregate analyses across the board. It gives an 
excellent snap shot of what is happening in the world. It may or not link the causes for 
this economic performance. One would have to look deeper in to the situation in each of 
the country. That is difficult to determine given the time that such an activity would 
require.  The  advantage  of  such  an  analysis  is  that  it  allows  initiating  thinking  on  a 
different plane. That such a document should not be taken as dogma or doctrinaire. Its 
positive elements have to be worked.   
Effects of Resource Booms  
The  historical  analysis  lends  much  to  the  thesis  that  the  developed  worlds 
developed an economic system that was different from the economic system of the less 
developed countries situated in the tropics [or elsewhere]. That there was more than just 
economics involved. What were the reasons for this is not very well documented. But I Zafar Altaf  374
suspect that the decisions were outside the realm of economics for this development. I 
have difficulty with some of the symbolism used by the author in the sense [and I can 
speak of the subcontinent only] for I do not see the linkage between wages and higher 
productivity  or  the  presence  of  peasant  entrepreneur.  Having  carried  out  some 
examination of the rural areas in Pakistan myself the concept of rural entrepreneur in the 
subcontinent is a non-starter. There are no peasant entrepreneurs and not even any risk 
takers  in  the  cropping  system.  The  evidence  to  that  affect  is  visible  in  the  cropping 
pattern. Four crops take away 93 percent of resources and the fact that there are no risks 
taken by the peasant is apparent.   
The idea that industrialisation is the solution to per capita incomes is fallacious for 
there are important provisos that have to be met. For one the population in the sub-
continent is massive and militates against taking excess agricultural population from the 
sector to finding jobs for them in the industrial sector. For another the industrial option 
may have been foreclosed because of the current product requirements of the developed 
countries. For yet another the developed world would like to bring in non-tariff barriers 
such as human rights, child labour or and environmental considerations so that whatever 
is produced never finds a place in the markets of the developed countries. There are 
reasons  to  protect  the  develop  world  for  they  do  not  want  unemployment  in  their 
countries [and in that sense what they advise to the developing countries in terms of 
market  access  is  not  part  of  their  economic  activities  when  they  fall  on  hard  times. 
Economic  principles  at  that stage  are put on  the back  burner.   The recent  settlement 
countries [Canada, USA and Australia as these countries were part and parcel of the 
colonial countries] were not colonised the way the tropical countries were and they were 
not abused in terms of siphoning off of resources. In fact the population structure was 
modified and mass migration from the mother countries was sent there to colonise the 
new lands.  
If we take the case of Pakistan then cotton came as a result of the requirements of 
Manchester textile mills and it came to a newly colonised land bear Khanewal and in fact 
a British farmer organised along corporate lines was responsible for it. The cause and 
effect has to be properly linked. I am unable to state for any other country though I take 
the point about the upscale of manufactured products. The current thinking is that the 
developing countries suffer from o-ring development and that all their functioning is not 
in harmony. They can do the relatively simple things better and are unable to get in to 
complicated product development. In the case of Pakistan the advice given was that 100 
robber barons would develop this country [Papanek (1959-60)]. We now know that 22 
robber barons were enough to become rent seekers and a mafia [that set the pace for 
others to emulate them] as they had 83 percent of all industrial assets. That has set the 
tone  for  industrialisation  in  this  country.  These  were  not  by  any  standards  peasant 
entrepreneurs. The problem continues to this day.  
The loss of competitiveness could also be analysed differently. The cultural aspect 
has been missed out. The lead sector in Pakistan is textiles and yet textiles have never 
been competitive in world markets. Explicit and implicit subsides have been responsible 
for making them competitive. Studies have shown that the textile sector suffers from a 
number  of  ailments  despite  having  70  percent  export  earnings.  Despite  pampered 
facilities they are not competitive. So there are other reasons as to loss of competitiveness 
other than what is stated in the paper.  Comments  375
I am uncomfortable with the analysis and that could be a purely personal bias but 
there is more to it than resource endowment. The economy may well be dependent on a 
number of other factors and as it has been seen the countries in the developing world are 
entirely dependent on the markets of the west. The basis for access to these markets is 
allowed  provided  the  local  job  markets  are  not  affected.  [The  case  of  US  Steel 
manufactures]. What is eventually important is to that the economy, any economy, defies 
simplistic analysis. That does not indicate that this analysis is spurious but simply that 
more variables be included to make it realistic.  
What  makes  the  paper  interesting  is  the  way  it  has  tried  to  analyse  different 
especially resource rents and public expenditure on education. Again the picture is a 
mixed one and the current commodity situations arise from the excess of these profits  
[defined as difference between prices and costs]. That is exactly what has happened in 
some commodities at the moment. For agricultural land the measure is arable land per 
capita and from the Pakistan scene it is obvious that this measure will have to change and 
will keep on changing. In one year 3 million hectares have reduced the existing arable 
land. The existing arable land would also change due to population increases. Again in 
the case of Pakistan the definition of arable land has to undergo a change for the resource 
base  will  have  to  change  to  accommodate  the  requirements  of  the  country.  The 
assumption that arable land is given is erroneous. Depending on technology [s] the arable 
land base can improve although with the current knowledge this has not been so. This 
could be a moving goal post and therefore one has to be aware of the datedness of the 
land data. Now technologies are available that can use marginal land and marginal water 
for production purposes without degrading soils.    
How does a country figure in terms of education and again there is no single 
measure. The author has tried to bring on record with considerable success the variables 
that could be used as measure[s]—a peculiar fetish to understand the economy based on 
the culture of materialism of the west. There are growing numbers of students that are 
going to the west and over time this has affected the educational bias in the developing 
countries. This has also led to changed consumption patterns. This may still be a minority 
situation in most countries but the elites have very little use for localised education. The 
teeming masses in developing countries go to non-descript schools and that could be a 
basis for unschooled children. The decision-makers play a pivotal role in the knowledge 
development process and money is a necessary requirement but the essential aspect is the 
equity make up with the decision-maker. More and more resources are going in to tertiary 
education and that only helps the elites and is, to my mind, misallocation of resources. 
This kind of expenditure crowds out the possible benefits to the poorest in the country. 
Resource abundance is not a sure fire criteria for determining where the country stands in 
the overall use of these resources. Evidence could be found for any kind of thinking. That 
is the fallacy of aggregate analysis. It may be that manufacturing may lead to a different 
kind of human development that is more in keeping with the times and may eventually 
turn the country around.  
The analysis of rent grabbers is fascinating and in my view the topic has been 
excellently dealt with. It conveys the dilemma of the developing world where there are 
weak institutions and the tyranny of the few stand established. However there is another 
element that has yet to be touched for this tyranny could be institutionalised in countries Zafar Altaf  376
where the safeguard institutions have either been demolished or been weakened by events 
and reforms that were meant for that purpose. 
A  similar  remark  could  be  made  on  the  Presidential  and  the  parliamentary 
democracy.  The  lines  as rightly  pointed  out between  the  two  are hazy  because  even 
where there is a parliamentary democracy the power in the hands of the powerful could 
be such as could lead to cronyism, and the furtherance of clienteles and factionalism. The 
misallocation of resources is also caused not only by white elephant projects but also by 
ego-oriented  projects  that  have  no  economic  basis.  The  symbols  of  freedom and  the 
egoistic elements that go in to wastage of precious resources responsible for the malaise 
that is so obvious in developing countries.  
The incentives of leaders to various situations provide an interesting comparison 
with our own position. There is obviously a case for considering the various facets of 
centralisation in decision-making and the culture of control and command decisions that 
is central to any military government. The degree of centralisation cannot be quantified 
although one can determine the various payers that are influenced by the agencies that are 
within the grip of the leader. Although  there is a fetish about finances and financial 
constraints the one important aspect that this paper touches is this single-handed manner 
by which resources are wasted. The classification of leaders is again one of interest and 
although one accepts the various elements provided in the paper the extreme positions 
have  not  been  touched  upon  where  the  leader  becomes  the  overall  all  knowing 
omnipresent  all  encompassing  leader,  a  situation  that  is  visible  in  the  Central  Asian 
Republics not to mention Pakistan in the present and the past decades. The consequences 
of such actions and how they are manifested are also not touched. The countries most 
affected by such decisions show a tendency to social unrest and that can culminate in a 
modification  of  borders  of  the  developing  countries.  The  case  of  Pakistan,  the 
Balkanisation of Yugoslavia and such other divisions are evidence of what I have stated.   
The paper’s best elements are where the leaders aspects are examined and the 
motivations manifested. The leaders that are civilian and those that don the uniform have 
different basis and different motivations and a different time horizon to their decisions 
and the manner of those decisions. A colonial heritage leads one to develop the same kind 
of interest group that act as a safeguard and as champions of all that is untenable in 
human terms. The democratic forces of the west, indicating double standards, when it 
comes to there own interests, have upheld the current situation in the Pakistan and have 
sided with the autocratic government but they do not do so where their interests are not 
best served. The tragedy of the people of Pakistan is that the forces that have been talking 
about democratic values have unfairly treated the people of this country. The question 
then is are the means to an end important or are the ends important in themselves? It is a 
moral question and it has jeopardised the country in to all kinds of problems. The other 
issue is that when the leaders have unfettered powers then the element of deceit and lies 
crops  up.  The  electronic  media  is  then  held  hostage  to  the  powers  that  be  and  the 
democratic forces that have created that media is also not accountable. These are difficult 
issues for current trend economists to handle but these need attention even though at a 
very preliminary level. A detached point of view occasionally has to give way to stating 
things as they are in a country without let. That is where I find the current paper though 
having an excellent premise is found wanting. What would be the contention with respect Comments  377
to The Democratic Republic of Congo where the colonial powers have literally raped the 
country?  Rich  in  natural  resources  the  exploitation  by  the  colonial  powers  and  the 
brutality can never be imagined. One has to be a student of history to also understand 
what kind of heritage the colonial powers left behind. Was it not a legacy of conflict and 
hate?  How  could  natural  resources remove the human  costs  that were and  are being 
incurred? So a more holistic view would have been more appropriate.      
Although cross sectional evidence has been provided but the fact is that a leader 
with institutional backing can make or break a country. The dollar aid can go further if 
there is circumspect action and less development of the self and the coterie that comes in 
to power. The fault, if fault there be, is in the leader and not the resource or on the bust 
and boom elements. These are transitory where as a leader may be on for a long time and 
without the approval of or the mandate of the people. 
The paper examines new evidence and how democracy works and whether that 
leads to growth or not. The situation is loaded for the non-democrat is essentially telling 
every one that you have never had it so good as under the regime while all the ills are 
foisted  onto  the  international  scene  and  the  democratic  government.  The  presidential 
elections can be by a limited electoral college and one has seen how and the manner in 
which this could be done. Since there is no law available for redress it is get what you can 
for as quickly as you can. A systematic effort at statutory desecration and breaking the 
legal  safeguards  allows  them  to  rule  the  country  as  they  wish  since  there  is  no 
accountability.  The  support  of  mavericks  that  go  against  established  democratic 
principles is acceptable to the policy-makers of the west who then provide some kind of 
insurance  to  the  legal  violator  for  services  rendered.  The  resource  base  is  hardly  a 
consideration for movement into democracy. The level of bribes and the immorality of 
man made laws is something that is very vast and would call for a more detailed and in 
depth examination. Monetary corruption or bribes in developing countries where there is 
no legislative accountability is of limited concern but what is more important is how 
mental  corruption  has  come  in  to  play.  How  institutions  have  been  demolished  for 
personal reasons? In the case of developing countries normative approach to better living 
is not a certainty, or even a remote possibility.   
In conclusion the author has summarised his findings in the context of a resource 
rich country and come to as usual a variety of findings. The picture that does emerge is a 
mixed one and it is true to a point. The patronage of the west to Indonesia and other 
Asian countries has severely dented the reputation of the recipient country. USA has a 
role  to  play  but  that  role-play  has  led  to  damage  dependence  from  the  Indian 
moneylender.   
Long-term strategy is something that would lead to growth. The upshot is one can find 
from the amount of imports that most of the policies followed could have been modified to 
such an extent that the resource use could have been within the country. Countries that have 
flawed institutions can go as they have done or stimulate change. It is basically a question of 
chance or considered change. Intentions do play a large part in such decisions.  
Zafar Altaf 
Islamabad. 